

Conscription and European Security: A Theoretical First-Step

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In the 18 year process of European reintegration, military conscription – as a feature of the European political scene – has largely vanished. The evaporation of sizeable, conscripted militaries reflects the widespread belief that conscription is a political, economic and military anachronism reminiscent of times of great continental insecurity and international militarism which are no longer considered valid sources of European identity. Instead, security identities in post-Cold War Europe are increasingly forged by cosmopolitan values such as democratic internationalism, human rights protection, legal-secularism, political transparency (including the democratisation of foreign policy) and the social market economic system.

It seems that Europe is ready to bury and forget Cold War reminders as the EU boldly (if cautiously) extends and deepens its regional and international commitments. However, as this work argues, some Cold War conceptions are better served public and polished. Conscription is one such conception. EU interests – its ability to fulfil its new-found international responsibilities – would be greatly enhanced by recycling and reshaping, rather than abandoning conscription to suit the changing international political environment.

In popular historical and political discourses, conscription and war are intractably connected. This is because, with few exceptions, conscription was based on war-fighting, often enacted to prepare a population for military service on an active front. Commonly, narratives of conscription have been subordinated to narratives of war. This work abandons such a causal view of conscription and offers normative insights into the developing linkages between extensive peace-time conscription efforts and the emergence of international society with responsible international citizens. This work argues that conscription – in democratic states – must be extended and deepened (reintroduced

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where it has been abolished) to prepare democratic societies for dealing with the 21st century international security agenda through a mixture of moral, legal and technical education, specialised training and experience. Two main hypotheses are explored at length.

Hypothesis 1:

Peace-time conscription extended to include moral, legal and technical education decreases state level aggression and helps to ‘humanitise’ soldiering.

Hypothesis 2:

Mature democratic states extending mandatory education are better prepared socially, economically, militarily and morally to deal with changing international security conditions of the 21st century.

This work is meant to add to the growing literature focussing on developing responsible international society. By providing an alternative view of conscription and how it may be utilised for inducing the emergence of an international society characterised by cosmopolitan values (see page 28 above) and governed by a reasonably agreed upon morality which places the sanctity of human life above all else, it is hoped that this work inspires other academics, students of politics and those interested in the future of international society to join the increasingly public demands that democratic states, which pride themselves as the vanguard defenders and proliferators of democratic values, make international contributions to those ends.

As non-conventional, asymmetrical security threats increase in frequency and ferocity, there is growing concern within democratic societies that traditional military provisions are not adequate to defend the rights and values inherent to democratic citizens. To allay such concerns, democratic states must drastically reassess their policy measures regarding poverty, unemployment, crime and violence prevention and failed states within regional and international contexts. Further education and advanced, widened and deepened peace-time conscription is an appropriate vehicle towards the achievement of two key goals:

1. Advancing a cosmopolitan perspective in the political landscape of a state’s citizenry and increase his/her attachment to wider international society
2. Promoting democratic responsibility – among citizens – to lead by example, through the utilisation of citizens’ educational period towards realising a more prepared and humane international society

This work concludes by making specific recommendations – directed at democratic governments – regarding the actualisation of the varieties and direction of progressive peace-time conscription programmes. These are intended to contribute to continuing debates over the future of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which depends on normative regional

defence to ensure that Europe's democratic values are not bartered away for intangible security against intangible threats. It is my firm belief that an extensive programme of peace-time conscription, widened to include many non-military programmes, and deepened to give substance to such programmes, will invariably contribute to the long-term safety, security and international influence of the EU.

(Re)Defining Conscription for the 21st Century

There are suspiciously few definitions of conscription in international relations literature. Most discussions, essays and books which deal with conscription simply avoid academically defining it and tend to rely on popular dictionary definitions. Some international relations theorists simply discuss the phenomenon without defining it at all, in the hope that a reasonable understanding may naturally emerge. In all, most intellectual examinations of conscription lack a robust definition and instead simply declare it mandatory (or forced) military obligations,² call-up, or in American political jargon, 'the draft.'

Christopher Jehn and Zachary Selden's work entitled, "The End of Conscription in Europe?"³ serves as a strong example of this. These authors immerse readers into a political and economic narrative of conscription, which while very insightful, spends too much time evaluating shifts in European perceptions of conscription without fully explaining what conscription really entails. They are hardly alone. A level of subject reification is present in nearly all surveys and theoretical articles focussed on conscription.⁴

(Re)Defining conscription is essential. Theories of peace- and war-time conscription may help paint a more vivid picture of international society and the division of responsibility within it. Thus, on the theoretical side, (re)defining conscription narrows inquiries and allows the degree of focus required to explore the murky and nuanced implications. On the practical side, this paper advocates the wide-scale reintroduction of conscription programmes throughout the members of the European Union. Such a position will, hopefully, spark

² Casey B. Mulligan and Andrei Shleifer, "Conscription as Regulation," *American Law and Economics Review*, 7:1, 2005. Pg. 88.

³ Christopher Jehn and Zachary Selden, "The End of Conscription in Europe?" *Contemporary Economic Policy*, 20:2, 2002. Pg. 93-100.

⁴ For additional examples of subject reification among leading theorists of conscription see: Casey B. Mulligan and Andrei Shleifer, "Conscription as Regulation," *American Law and Economics Review*, 7:1, 2005. Pg. 85-110. Joseph Paul Vasquez III, "Shouldering the Soldiering: Democracy, Conscription and Military Casualties," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49:6, 2005. Pg. 849-873, Seung Whan Choi and Patrick James, "No Professional Soldiers, No Militarised Interstate Disputes: A New Question for Neo-Kantianism," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 47:6, 2003. Pg. 796-816, Bjørn Møller, "Conscription and Its Alternatives," *The Comparative Study of Conscription in the Armed Forces*, Volume 20, 2002. Pg. 277-305.

a much needed debate over international society and Europe's ability to carve out a niche of 'civilian power.' (Re)Defining conscription will, it is hoped, assuage critics of peace-time conscription by clearly and unambiguously projecting the scope and boundaries of such programmes.

Peace-time conscription is understood as a system of advanced practical education focussing on challenges to local, regional and international society. Such conscription programmes parallel programmes of higher education in that they are mandatory to all citizens of a state not attending college, university, or equivalent degree or certificate programmes. Peace-time conscription is meant to increase citizens' sense of responsibility towards society (local, regional, and international); increase awareness of challenges to those societies and brings 'civilian power' to the foreground of overcoming such challenges.

Crucially, the parameters of such a practical education within a peace-time conscription programme are deeply reliant on recognising current security challenges, implying a direct correspondence between security and education. This requires a great deal of flexibility. The European Union, long thought of as a slow and reactive institution, can revitalise its image through proffering flexibility to its budding foreign policy and defence culture in its extended EU boundaries. Flexibility – in recognising potential challenges to international society; in the deployment of political and economic resources; of sociological preparation, and in times of crises; of military force – is central to the maintenance and further development of civil society (on all levels) and may act as a guidepost for developing democracies around the world.

This linkage between conscription as advanced practical education and a recognised security environment reaches back in history. However, until the late 20th and early 21st centuries, advanced education manifest in conscription was rooted in militarism, and the skills developed during conscription were meant to prepare a state's youth for active military service. This has been the tragedy of conscription since its widespread introduction in Napoleonic times – that preparatory education of a state's youth implied war-training.

From such tragic beginnings, peace-time conscription – to fill normative objectives within international society – may be launched.

'Civilian Power' and Peace-Time Conscription

Before delving into the main arguments of this work, a brief discussion of motivation is required. Simply, why would the EU be interested in advancing programmes of conscription given a general aversion to military force among EU members? To answer this question, a review of the EU's security identity is required. Although it is difficult to precisely attribute the EU a single source of security identification, there is growing reliance on 'civilian power' as a point of reference, guiding EU foreign policy priorities. 'Civilian power' generally maintains military force as a residual rather than a primary tool of

policy actualisation. However, military force is an important ingredient in the budding EU security culture gravitating around ‘civilian power.’ The peace-time conscription model advanced in this work is meant to instil a sense of responsibility in international society, to conscripted forces. If ‘civilian power’ is to determine the foreign policy priorities of the EU, then the military force held as a residual tool must be drawn from the broad base of European societies and not left to professional soldiers, whose motivations for enlisting into a military structure are often rooted in socio-economic imperatives and military fascination rather than advancing the ‘civilian power’ goals of the EU. Before bridging ‘civilian power’ to peace-time conscription, a brief account of ‘civilian power’ is required.

Similar to conscription, the concept of ‘civilian power’ was popularised during the Cold War. It is commonly attributed to François Duchêne who, writing in 1972 said that

Europe would be the first major area of the Old World where the age-old processes of war and indirect violence could be translated into something more in tune with the twentieth-century citizen’s notion of civilised politics.⁵

According to Richard Whitman, “Duchêne’s conception of a European civilian power rested upon the inconceivability of a nuclear armed European federation and the banishment of war from Western Europe.”⁶ Duchêne’s convictions, that the possibility of nuclear war in Europe forced political and popular reflections which concluded that its utility had run its course, proved with hindsight to be extremely accurate. Duchêne explored techniques for *domesticating* European politics, arguing that through institutions, which could arbitrate tensions and conflicts, a common sense of responsibility could be nurtured. In short, Duchêne argued that the development of a common sense of responsibility would help states (in a European context) recognise their shared interests. For Europe, those interests meant avoiding nuclear war in which there would be no winner. The notion of recognising common interests in avoiding war (nuclear and other WMD) act as a bedrock of European ‘civilian power.’

While Duchêne’s thoughts offer a wealth of ideas to students interested in current international society, they have been eclipsed by other, more contemporary authors who spearheaded a renaissance in casting European ‘civilian power.’ Hanns Maull⁷ and Christopher Hill⁸ have both contributed to more

⁵ François Duchêne, “Europe’s Role in World Peace.” Found in, R. Mayne (ed.) *Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead*. Fontana Books, London UK, 1972.

⁶ Richard Whitman, “The Fall, and Rise of Civilian Power Europe?” *National Europe Centre Paper No. 16*. Pg. 3.

⁷ Hanns W. Maull, “Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers.” *Foreign Affairs*, 69:5, 1990/1. Pg. 91-106.

⁸ Christopher Hill, “The Capability-Expectation Gap, or Conceptualising Europe’s International Role.” *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 31:3, 1993. Pg. 305-328.

current, understandings of ‘civilian power’ which are useful for comprehending the need for establishing representative militaries, conscripted from societies which define themselves as ‘civilian powers.’ Both Maull and Hill have faced numerous criticisms, however, as the EU continues to construct its security identity, their original hypotheses have been reintroduced as guideposts. Bridging the conceptions of ‘civilian power’ introduced by these two theorists will help paint a more vivid picture of current ‘civilian power’ and how peace-time conscription may assist the EU in achieving its ‘civilian power’ tasks.

Hanns Maull, in his work entitled, “Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers,” identifies three essential conditions for a state to be considered a ‘civilian power.’ These are

1. the acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of international objectives
2. concentration on non-military, primarily economic, means to secure national goals, with military power left as a residual instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means of international interaction
3. a willingness to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of international management⁹

In other words, states’ ‘civilian power’ rests on cooperation to achieve international objectives, the deployment of non-military instruments of policy (with military power left in reserve) and fostering states’ willingness to construct international agents which – through cooperation – can tackle international challenges. Although Maull refers to Japanese and German foreign policy priorities, the EU has made considerable steps towards constructing its own Common Foreign and Security Policies oriented to the achievement of these ‘civilian power’ goals.¹⁰

The EU is a cooperative union whose ultimate power rests on its ability to agree – although reaching agreement can be an arduous task – on issues pertaining to regional and international security. The EU regards the deployment of military force as a residual and not primary tool of diplomacy and tends to deploy alternative power resources (primarily economic) as a means of asserting international influence. Finally, the development of the CFSP is evidence of the EU drive towards coordinating member foreign policy priorities under a supranational umbrella.

⁹ Hanns W. Maull, “Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers.” *Foreign Affairs*, 69:5, 1990/1. Pg. 92-3.

¹⁰ For an excellent account of EU External Security Priorities see: “Europe in the World – Some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility.” Communication from the Commission to the European Council of June 2006. Brussels 08 June 2006. This document is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euw_com06_278_en.pdf (accessed 03 May 2007).

Christopher Hill bases his notion of ‘civilian power’ on six functions regarding the (then) EC. These are:

1. a replacement for the (then) USSR in the global balance of power
2. regional pacifier
3. global intervener
4. mediator of conflicts
5. bridge between rich and poor
6. joint supervisor of the world economy¹¹

Hill’s first function may be omitted. The EU is not motivated towards balancing (even softly) the US.¹² In fact, through NATO and other transatlantic forums, the EU and the US are bound tightly together in their mutual quest to maintain a human rights based international society. This does not indicate confluence over the means deployed to reinforce international society and there have been numerous transatlantic disputes including, over the International Criminal Court (ICC), Guantanamo Bay prisoners, Operation Iraqi Freedom (etc.). However, it is apparent that Europe is not attempting to replace the USSR as a balancer in international society.

Hill’s remaining five functions may be used to depict post-Cold War EU ‘civilian power.’ The EU’s ‘security through integration’ programme has contributed significantly to the Euro zone of peace by offering economic incentives for structural changes and developments in fostering civil and democratic societies among both new and old members. Together with NATO, the UN and increasingly in coalitions of the willing, the EU has begun to shed its reluctance to intervene in ensuing international conflicts or in areas of potential violence in both preemptive and preventive roles. Finally, the EU recognises the connection between poverty, crime, terrorism and other forms of political violence, and has taken important steps to bridge the international wealth gap. Economic security is a powerful incentive for domesticating international relations as it provides a conduit for citizen ownership of their political state.

Together, Maull and Hill’s depictions capture EU ‘civilian power.’ Military power is present but held in reserve, while other forms of power are deployed in a cooperative manner (as opposed to unilateralism) to help civilise political interactions (domestic and international).

‘Civilian power’ is presently a defining feature of EU security culture. However, it is only a theoretical fixture, governing policy identification and

¹¹ Christopher Hill, “The Capability-Expectation Gap, or Conceptualising Europe’s International Role.” *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 31:3, 1993. Pg. 305-328.

¹² Robert A. Pape provides an interesting account of ‘soft balancing’ though he assumes that many parts of international society (including several European powers) have already begun to balance against the US. See: Robert A. Pape, “Soft Balancing against the United States.” *International Security*, 30:1, 2005. Pg. 7-45.

prioritisation but not actualisation. The ‘Headline Goals,’ the European Rapid Reaction Force envisioned in Helsinki (1999) has not yet been realised. It is therefore difficult to attach significance to the ‘civilian power’ model of the EU, as its members have not contributed the resources needed to fulfil its ‘civilian power’ goals.¹³

As an amendment to the ‘civilian power’ project, peace-time conscription may be an indispensable tool. It has the potential to realise the normative goals of the EU by educating and training EU youth towards the defence of an international society defined by the cosmopolitan values listed on page 28 above.

As discussed below (page 37-38), professional soldiers will not suffice for constructing and defending EU values. Only by raising and reshaping the mandatory period of education (theoretical and practical) can the EU hope to positively infuse international society with ‘civilian power’ as a standard of international exchange. 20th century militarism, genocide and imposed ideological movements have left their mark on European consciousness. At present, the EU must not sit on the fringes of international society when conflicts and crises, which run counter to progressive EU thinking, threaten the viability of cosmopolitan international society. Peace-time conscription can assist the EU in its ambitious ‘civilian power’ project.

In his work entitled “Conscription and Its Alternatives,” Bjørn Møller identifies four reasons why “states may abstain from fielding armed forces ...”¹⁴ These are:

- 1) They do not perceive any threats to their sovereignty or territorial integrity
- 2) They are so small that defence is obviously futile
- 3) They rely on external protection
- 4) They rely on a non-military form of defence¹⁵

For the European Union (and its members) these criteria for military abstention have not been met. While direct conventional threats to the EU (and its members) are remote, they have not entirely vanished. The terrorist attacks perpetrated against Spain (2004) and the UK (2005) are stark reminders of the insecurities open societies face from within, and the (not so distant) break-up of the former Yugoslav Republic, which resulted in mass murder, ethnic cleansing and mass displacement, prompt EU memories of the horrors of war and its potential contagion. Threats continue to define the EU’s security iden-

¹³ For an excellent discussion of the European Rapid Reaction Force and the 1992 “Petersberg Tasks,” see: Isabelle Ioannides, “The European Rapid Reaction Force: Implications for Democratic Accountability,” *Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC)*, September 2002. This article is available at: www.bicc.de/publications/papers/paper24/paper24.pdf

¹⁴ Bjørn Møller, “Conscription and Its Alternatives,” *The Comparative Study of Conscription in the Armed Forces*, Volume 20, 2002. Pg. 295.

¹⁵ Ibid. Pg. 295.

tity; even if the source of threat has changed according to international realities and the implosion of a belligerent external adversary, the USSR.

As challenges change so must the tactics for dealing with them. It would be both foolish and irresponsible for the EU to abandon a capable military altogether. Instead, the EU should reformulate its priorities and how to effectively deal with current security challenges. By increasingly defining itself as a ‘civilian power,’ the EU has tacitly abandoned a pacifist or neutral foreign policy orientation. A ‘civilian power’ point of reference, where military power is present but held in reserve, helps to overcome the taboo of using military force, for force can be deployed in a responsible manner, consistent with the values of the EU.

The question must no longer revolve around whether the EU should raise and maintain military forces? Given the types and intensity of international conflicts, the question should be, ‘what type of military instruments should be developed to maintain the values of European society, promote international peace, security and justice and generally defend the EU’s territory, people and international interests?’

Peace-Time Conscription and ‘Humanitising’ Soldiering

War-time conscription – understood here as forced military labour or forced financial contributions to a war-machine – prepares a state’s youth for war fighting, even if defensively oriented. With few exceptions, state-level war-time conscription seeks to create obedience among its youth with an expressed prerogative of deference to orders. Such conscription programmes may be necessary under certain geopolitical and security conditions, which will not be further discussed here. Instead, it is important to look beyond war-time preparations and gauge how peace-time conscription programmes in states not facing dire conventional military threats can effect state behaviour and encourage normative internationalism and the promotion of cosmopolitan values.

In contrast to reactive war-time conscription, peace-time conscription is proactive. It is designed to expand the political horizon of a state’s youth – rather than narrowing it while creating obedient war-fighters – and provide a structured vehicle towards the development of a societal level consciousness in which social and democratic responsibility (locally, regionally and internationally) may be propagated. Peace-time conscription also helps habilitate military structures by infusing them with citizen values. In essence, peace-time conscription can help ‘humanitise’ soldiering. This may be achieved through the advancement of two main goals:

- 1) Reducing reliance on professional soldiers
- 2) Fusing military structures with citizens of diverse economic, social, political and ethnic backgrounds

It is beneficial to explore these goals to provide deeper understanding of the positive outcomes the promotion of a comprehensive peace-time conscription programme may produce for the EU and international society at large.

1. Reducing Reliance on Professional Soldiers

Professional soldiering is incompatible with the general value system of the EU and its ‘civilian power’ policy prioritisation. Utilising specialised combat forces for defence, peace-keeping and peace-making missions may be economically feasible; however, they are not in sync with the demands of democratic societies. This incompatibility is related primarily to recruitment and not necessarily the functions professional forces later serve. However, if the EU is to shoulder more international responsibility while defending itself (conventionally and exceptionally) and maintaining its core values, it must shift away from a ‘special forces’ focus, directing its military affairs.

Professional armies typically recruit the bulk of their personnel from two main categories of citizens, the economically disadvantaged and those fascinated with military weapons, conduct and structure.

Those who are economically disadvantaged often join the military to receive free or discounted education, financial security for their families and tax support from their state. While this does not pose a direct challenge to fulfilling the ‘civilian power’ objectives of the EU, it does not contribute to citizen ownership of the military or infuse the values of a democratic population into the military structure of a state. In fact, filling the rank and file positions in a professional military with the economically disadvantaged often reinforces negative ethnic and class stereotypes. In this, Møller rightly asserts that “As national and racial minorities almost everywhere have a below-average level of employment; it is reasonable to expect all-volunteer armed forces to be able to recruit a higher percentage of these.”¹⁶ Møller goes on to explain that “minorities are overrepresented in ... armies ...”¹⁷

There are a number of internal and international problems associated with such an overrepresentation of minority groups in the professional militaries in the states of the EU. Firstly, such recruitment imbalances may result in charges of racism by the minority community, and internationally. It is difficult to convince international society of positive intents and designs with such a high level of economic disparity (and ethnicity) between policy makers (and beneficiaries) and policy enforcers. Only through disseminating policy enforcement responsibilities to all social spheres within European society, can the EU convincingly present its normative internationalist agenda. Parity needs to be established between how the EU views itself, and how international society views the EU.

¹⁶ Ibid. Pg. 289.

¹⁷ Ibid. Pg. 289.

Secondly, is the issue of recruit motivation. If recruits are drawn primarily from minority groups and in the present military structure of EU states this implies specialisation operations (for civil defence), international peace-keeping, peace-making and war-fighting, the question of troop morale and motivation is raised. Recruits which participate in military operations though feel detached from their state do not perform as well on the battle-field as multinational recruits which feel as though they have a stake in a conflicts' outcome. When infusing EU military culture with 'civilian power' it is imperative to provide ownership of military matters to recruits themselves. This again requires the abandonment of professional soldiers, for if drawn primarily from the economically disadvantaged and ethnic minorities, there is little hope of convincing recruits of their moral as well as military function. Such groups tend to view their military 'tours' as employment and not as a normative contribution to the state or international society. Peace-time conscription can alleviate this situation and increase the morale and motivation of recruits to fulfil normative objectives because with mass participation comes ownership of the political process and its regional and international tasks.

More dangerous than recruits drawn from the economically disadvantaged or an overrepresentation of ethnic minorities, are those fascinated with military structures and machinery. Professional militaries necessarily attract those people who willingly join a military to, crassly, shoot guns, drive tanks, fly fighter jets. Realising 'civilian power' goals will remain an elusive task if reliance on professional soldiers, who join military structures due to military fascination, remains in place. The irony of introducing a peace-time conscription programme is that recruits should maintain their revulsion to combat and warfare, though participate as a matter of civic responsibility. For this reason, peace-time conscription should be oriented towards many non-military functions, as well as the more traditional tasks of a military structure (see pages 40-48 below).

2. Fusing Military and Civilian Values

As the EU attempts to create a viable military to ensure its, and international security, its reliance on professional soldiers – particularly those fascinated by military machines and structure – needs to be reduced. Only through the fusion of military and civilian values can there be a 'humanitising' process among soldiers and other recruits. Such a fusion cannot take root in militaries dominated by professional soldiers; it can only be imported from civilians themselves. Thus, peace-time conscription is necessary to infuse the values of society into military structures.

When conscripts are involved in international operations (military, humanitarian or relief work) civilians in their home country show great intolerance at callous deployments, dangerous missions, abuses (against the conscripts

or indigenous population), and excesses of force. This intolerance at putting conscripts in harms way has led to much political upheaval in states deploying them. Both France (during the Algerian conflict) and the US (during the Vietnam conflict) utilising conscripts alongside professional soldiers, were confronted by immense anti-war protests and movements directly related to rising death tolls and horror stories of abuse reported by conscripts. Breaking the military 'code of silence' and loathing abuses and human rights violations are part of 'humanitising' soldiering. Infusing civilian values into a military structure can result in increased awareness of military abuses and force democratic states to take actions to create a greater level of transparency in a military.

Using the case of France in the Algerian war, George Q. Flynn remarked that

... conscripts in Algeria proved to be a two-edged sword. While fulfilling their military obligations, they also criticised torture and channelled unrest back to metropolitan France.¹⁸

Bringing the values of metropolitan France with them, conscripts proved to lack a distinctive military culture and alerted loved ones back in France as to the systemic abuse of Algerians at the hands of French forces. They preformed under the pressures of a professional Officers Corp, however this was a war of occupation, not reconcilable with civilian values.

Similarly, Bjørn Møller asserts that

... as the United States experienced during the Vietnam War, there are limits to what the public will accept in terms of casualties among conscripts, as well as limits to the treatment that conscripted soldiers from all walks of life will endure.¹⁹

Conscripts in Algeria and Vietnam had not chosen to participate in military operations. Under the war-time conscription programmes popular in the immediate post-WWII era, civilians were forced into military structures. However, these conscripts did not abandon their civilian values and very bravely fulfilled their duty while openly questioning the logic of such operations.

Democratic citizens must collectively remember the horrors of war-time conscription – despite its infusion of civilian values – and avoid its return. At the same time, there must be increased awareness that professional soldiers lack civilian values because they generally lack contact with civilians. To solve this problem there must be a wide-scale reintroduction of conscription, carried out however, during peace-time, with legal and democratic full-transparency and guided by 'civilian power' objectives. No longer should militaries be operated solely by professional soldiers. An influx of civilians into a military

¹⁸ George Q. Flynn, "Conscription and Equity in Western Democracies, 1940-75." *Journal of Contemporary History*, 33:1, 1998. Pg. 13.

¹⁹ Bjørn Møller, "Conscription and Its Alternatives." *The Comparative Study of Conscription in the Armed Forces*, Volume 20, 2002. Pg. 280.

structure, which is expanded to include military and non-military roles, will assist in defending (without themselves violating) the core values of a state. In short, civilians can ‘humanitise’ soldiering and increase the accountability of those wishing to deploy force (or other means).

Introducing peace-time conscription programmes in democratic states requires a new ‘social contract,’ one which stresses the importance of the citizen’s responsibility towards the collective and its defence. Since in EU security culture, defence has widened to include a particularly non-military element, the new ‘social contract’ must include the EU’s pledge to govern the deployment of conscripted forces reasonably and in line with the general will of EU civil society. The idea of a ‘social contract’ was first developed by Jean Jacques Rousseau who wrote of men “aggregating a sum of forces that could gain the upper hand (over nature) ... so that their forces are directed by means of a single moving power and made to act in concert.”²⁰

Peace-time conscription is based on a similar approach. There must be an aggregation of people’s forces which could gain the upper hand – over violations to international and European society – however these must not be solely based on war-fighting, but rather on the collective skills and progressive, human rights based identity which European citizens have been developing for several hundreds of years, and intensely since the horrors of the Holocaust and WWII emerged as public discourse. While Rousseau spoke of a social contract for men bartering their freedom (in the state of nature) for security (in the state of society), the new ‘social contract’ governing the actions and deployments of peace-time conscription units must be designed to translate European historic learning, professional expertise and responsibilities, into international realities that reinforce international society.

Peace-time conscription invariably challenges war culture where the distinction between ‘civilians’ (citizens) and ‘combatants’ (soldiers) forms the foundation of the laws of war. Peace-time conscription intractably merges the ‘civilian’ with the ‘soldier’ and forces the latter to be subordinate to the former, as the rank and file members of the variety of conscription programmes are not military minded personnel; they are the equal citizens of democratic states, young men and women who must help shoulder the regional and international responsibilities which will help advance a more human rights based and equitable international society.

A Programme of Peace-time Conscription

After exploring some theoretical aspects of how peace-time conscription may assist in reinforcing current international society which is increasingly

²⁰ Jean Jacques Rousseau, *On the Social Contract*. Translated by, Donald A. Cress. Hackett Publishing, Cambridge UK, 1987. Pg. 147.

defined by cosmopolitan values (see page 28), it is necessary to offer some suggestions of what such conscription programmes should include and how they can translate into fulfilling the ‘civilian power’ goals of the EU. The following is a prototype of a comprehensive peace-time conscription programme. Attention is paid to identifying areas the EU should focus its attention on, and not how these programmes may be realised. There are numerous and hefty questions which must still be answered regarding the economic, legal and social costs and benefits to peace-time conscription. These, unfortunately fall outside of the scope of this work, which is to identify a new perspective over what needs to be done in the EU for dealing with the 21st century security agenda. It should be noted however, that in keeping with the ‘civilian power’ goals of the EU, the mandate to deploy peace-time conscription forces should be bound by EU and international law unless such laws constrict assistance to beleaguered peoples or states. In such circumstances, the EU must reserve the right to intervene (deploying peace-time conscription forces) into a civil or international conflict with a stated goal of preventing or reducing the loss of life to a civilian population. When reviewing some of the more brutal late 20th century conflicts, one may ask whether the EU did enough to end violence, mass murder or genocide. The answer is that it did not. Introducing a peace-time conscription programme may also provide the EU with enough political, humanitarian and military clout – deployable in a timely manner – to see its progressive cosmopolitan values become entrenched in societies afflicted by strife or conflict.

Peace-time conscription programmes must run parallel to higher education institutes. Citizens opting to attend traditional higher educational institutes must be exempt from conscription, for they serve civilian tasks through their education. All other citizens, (with exception given to mentally and physically incapable persons and teenaged parents) would be required to select – in a timely manner – the conscription programme that best suits their expertise, interests and future career ambitions. Peace-time conscription programmes should be made applicable to persons (male and female) between the ages of 19-25 and vary in duration from 12-20 months, including (if applicable) an international deployment period.

Peace-time conscription within the current international political environment should comprise the following 3 broad areas, termed here as units:

- 1) Specialised Medical Unit (SMU)
- 2) Local and International Policing Unit (LIPU)
- 3) Civic and Localised Defence Unit (CLDU)

The following discussion highlights specific aims and attributes of each of the three units. This section is meant as preliminary recommendations of what each unit should aim to achieve.

Specialised Medical Unit (SMU)

Some of the most pressing international challenges are related to medicine distribution, the spread of infectious disease, bio- and chemical terrorism and post-disaster hygiene. As such, it is imperative for developed democracies, for theirs and international security, to have a solid base of medical support which is both regionally and internationally deployable in an organised and timely manner. To that end, the SMU would be responsible for training and preparing conscripts to deal with the variety of challenges related to the field of medicine. Such training is indispensable for the long-term security of the EU and provides many benefits to international society including; increased life-expectancy and higher work-force efficiency, which may result in greater wealth generation and thus a general reduction in wealth disparity, prompting more demands for civilian ownership over the political state and ultimately assists in democratic promotion abroad.

To help achieve medical and health related goals, regionally and internationally, the SMU may be further divided into 2 subsections:

- 1) Civic Medical Aid
- 2) International Medical Aid

While both the Civic and International Medical Aid groups would be designed to prevent, contain and combat infectious diseases and viruses, reduce mortality rates in combat and post-combat areas and states affected by natural disasters and train medical staff in developing countries in modern medicinal techniques, their areas of operation would be different.

Conscripts enrolled in Civic Medical Aid would be trained in the local conditions of Europe. This requires a multinational dimension as language, cultural and sociological barriers are still present in the EU despite the removal of political boundaries. If conducted on a supranational level, much could be gained by mixing conscripts from among the different members of the EU. A Civic Medical Aid group of conscription recruits which operates from Ireland to Cyprus and Spain to Finland requires great coordination at both the inter-governmental and societal levels. This coordination can be utilised to deepen medical relations between different states, increase cooperation in medical research and development, increase the sharing of information and ultimately constructing a network of qualified medical staff which, after their conscription period concludes, will have greater employment mobility, through their qualifications, which would be equally accepted Europe-wide.

The Civic Medical Aid group would be divided into three focuses. First, a general medical assistance focus, which would provide additional support to hospitals and other medical centres for their day-to-day operations. Second, an emergency medical assistance focus, which prepares contingency plans of 'life-saving' following medical disasters such as a biological, chemical or conventional weapons attack, the outbreak of an infectious disease or natural

disasters. Finally, a hygiene, health and illness-prevention focus, which helps educate people towards healthy living.

While these focuses are broad, they are very important. Civic Medical Aid can act as a reserve ‘human resource’ of highly trained and easily mobilised medical staff which can reduce the loss of life caused by political violence, natural disasters or an outbreak of an infectious disease. Although this would be a branch of a peace-time conscription unit, and hence, its recruits would only be trained and mobilised temporarily (and with a high turnover rate), nevertheless, the skills these recruits develop during their training and mobilisation period would (hopefully) remain part of their knowledge base even after their conscription period ends. Thus, in times of conflict or natural devastations, these former recruits will still be able to positively assist in medical care-giving.

Alternatively, the International Medical Aid group should be divided according to specialisation, not geography. To deal with pressing international challenges where medical training is an asset, the International Medical Aid group should be designed as a reinforcement to the NGO, Doctors Without Borders, which is a “medical humanitarian organization that delivers emergency aid to people affected by armed conflict, epidemics, natural or man-made disasters, or exclusion from health care.”²¹

The International Medical Aid group would fulfil its support missions through an intensive training course (in Europe) and a period of international deployment to places in desperate need of medical assistance. Areas of speciality covered by the International Medical Aid group should include, conflict and post-conflict medical aid, field hospital construction, organisation and administration, social and psychological counselling, education, infectious disease containment and prevention. Such a peace-time conscription focus has the potential to assist states and peoples facing extreme health risks and reduce the number of casualties from natural and human-made disasters. The International Medical Aid group would be fundamentally committed to ‘life-saving’ and help provide health care to peoples and regions which lack adequate medical resources. The International Medical Aid group may also help train medical care-givers in developing countries in modern techniques and approaches, to be able to cope without outside assistance in the long-term.

Ultimately, the establishment of a peace-time conscription unit focussing on medical issues will assist the long-term security of the EU and act as a progressive and ‘life-saving’ force in international society. Recruits would be trained to deal with a variety of regional and international challenges through theoretical and practical knowledge involving medical techniques. The SMU would be readily deployable throughout the EU and international society.

²¹ Doctors Without Borders. Available at: <http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/aboutus/> (accessed 19 April 2007).

Local and International Policing Unit (LIPU)

The material security of the EU is increasingly tied to international stability, peace and the promotion of good governance abroad. Many international conflicts and tensions have the potential for contagion, particularly if aggrieved parties do not attract the attention of the UN or the great powers which could mediate disputes. Additionally, states and other political communities which have emerged from conflicts, man-made or natural disasters, often lack the resources to maintain order and political stability due to pressures on local institutions. Areas which lack political order are breeding grounds for criminality, as people attempt to provide their own security if the state cannot (or will not) provide it for them. These two challenges, preventing the initiation of political violence between states (and other political communities) and assisting in restoring or maintaining political stability and order in post-conflict and post-disaster communities, should be a policy priority in EU foreign affairs.

At present, the EU is not facing significant international threats – freeing it from concentrating solely on its own territorial security – and is commonly regarded as a well-balanced international actor, guided in its policy prioritisation by cosmopolitan values and actualisation increasingly through ‘civilian power.’ The EU could use the present surge of international goodwill to further promote its interests of conflict prevention, and reinforce a cosmopolitan value system as a standard of international exchanges. Utilising a peace-time conscription unit, designed as a cosmopolitan policing force, would greatly enhance the EU capability to achieve such goals. This brief account of a Local and International Policing Unit (LIPU), is meant to describe some areas the EU should focus on, in its quest to establish and protect an international society increasingly characterised by cosmopolitan values (see page 28 above).

LIPU would direct its efforts to achieving three main tasks:

- 1) Post-conflict and disaster policing with the aim of peacekeeping, preventing or reducing criminality, constructing or upholding civil society, local police training and providing a secure platform for humanitarian assistance to be delivered
- 2) Wartime/conflict/crises policing with the aim of peacemaking, separating actual (or potential) combatants, and preventing the callous loss of life among a civilian population
- 3) Investigation and reconciliation with the aim of investigating alleged criminal activities (including ‘crimes against humanity’), bringing (to regional or international courts, such as the ICC) those who are implicated in such criminality, and assisting in reconciliation (where applicable) between conflicting political communities by acting as a neutral arbiter

Policing is an essential element in constructing civil society. The EU should recruit and train peace-time conscripts to assist those parts of international

society where law and order have, or potentially will, collapse. Such deployments would (in most situations) require the acquiescence of the parties facing such a law-and-order breakdown, however, in extreme situations, where civilians face severe perils, LIPU should not await permission but rather be ready to deploy its police units to enforce, or reinforce civil society.

This is perhaps the most controversial peace-time conscription unit identified in this work, as it casts the EU as a purely normative international actor, even as it would assume responsibility for intervening into sovereign territories without the permission of local authorities, if there is a grave threat to a civilian population. To be sure, the EU has its own set of interests and priorities which go beyond bolstering international society. However, policing for the protection of civilians world-wide, to assist in governing post-disaster areas and preventing hostilities from erupting, is an intersection of international and EU security interests. For example, the EU has an interest in sustainable development and the promotion of democracy to encourage civilian ownership and responsible governments abroad. This interest is not purely normative, but also designed to reduce the attraction of Europe for asylum seekers and economic migrants. Ending hostilities and bringing order to post-disaster political communities may act as a catalyst towards these goals because establishing political order and protecting civilians is a first step towards economic rejuvenation, political stability, peace and good governance.

Civic and Localised Defence Unit (CLDU)

In keeping with the EU's 'civilian power' approach to international society, it must not completely abandon traditional military capabilities. The deployment of military force may be – under certain circumstances – a necessary evil, and the EU must be prepared to assume complete responsibility for its territorial, material and political security. Currently, NATO provides the most formidable security guarantee for the EU. However, the expectation that such an arrangement will reach into the indefinite future is misguided. The EU – together with NATO, while such an arrangement lasts – must assert strategic independence from the US. An integrated (politically, economically and militarily) EU must certainly remain in alliance with the US; however such an alignment must be confirmed between two equal partners, which is presently not the case. The EU is a junior partner which relies too heavily on the US and NATO for its security.

Also, NATO is a limiting defence alliance based on Article 5 of the Treaty of Washington (1949) which stipulates that an attack on one member is tantamount to an attack on all.²² While Article 5 was first invoked following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, there is

²² See "The North Atlantic Treaty", available at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/treaty.htm> (accessed 29 April 2007).

no reason to believe that terrorism constitutes an ‘attack’ which would rally NATO states together for collective action, despite terrorism being ranked among the most formidable threats facing EU states. The Madrid (2004) and London (2005) bombings, are stark reminders that the EU must face many security challenges without NATO and US assistance; there were no calls for a similar invocation of Article 5 following those attacks. In fact, upon hearing the news of the London bombings, George Bush Jr. spoke of international resolve to overcome an “ideology of hate,”²³ his response was to “instruct them (homeland security) to be in touch with local and state officials about the facts of what took place here and in London, and to be extra vigilant, as our folks start heading to work.”²⁴

While the scale of death and carnage from the 11 September 2001 attacks was greater than that produced by the Madrid or London bombings, the latter were very important milestones in the so-called ‘war on terror’ and played an important psychological and sociological role in casting European security identification. That the US and NATO did not attempt to further support Spain or the UK indicates a degree of abandonment. Although terrorism does not pose a direct challenge to the viability of a western democratic state, its eradication (by force, special operations or ‘hearts and minds’) remains a key security aim.

Such neglect will become more commonplace as the EU and US part ways over key foreign policy priorities and approaches. It is therefore imperative that the EU construct its own independent military structure, comprised of peace-time conscripts who infuse such structures with civilian values, and hence, maintain equilibrium between EU society and values and its defence provisions. To that end, the EU should develop a Civic and Localised Defence Unit which would be trained and operationally capable to deal with security challenges to the EU.

The CLDU should blend more traditional territorial defence initiatives with those oriented to the emergence of new threats and challenges and would be organised to achieve three directives:

- 1) To increase the traditional military defence capacity of the EU in a manner synchronised with the demands of EU society and values
- 2) Provide a robust civic counterterrorism initiative to identify and prevent incidents of terrorism, (including its financing, recruitment and operational deployment) within EU borders
- 3) To further develop an EU wide civic rapid reaction and disaster relief to deal with a multitude of disaster and post-disaster missions

²³ George W. Bush statement on the London bombing, 07 July 2005. This statement is available at: http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/london_bombing/bush_speech.html (accessed 01 May 2007).

²⁴ Ibid.

The first directive, with its emphasis on traditional military defence, would need to identify potential territorial threats and challenges and then develop appropriate and innovative methods for dealing with them. There are several areas of concern to the EU, which although not currently posing a direct challenge, could do so in the foreseeable future. Russia, the Middle East (including Iran) and Northern Africa may directly challenge – in both symmetrical and asymmetrical manners – EU territorial security.

At the time of this writing, only Russia has overtly threatened EU members. The Czech Republic and Poland have become the centre of a growing international crisis over their plans to assist the US missile defence system. Without opening debate over the wisdom for supporting the US in such a project, the EU must take Russian threats seriously and retain a capacity for deterring Russian interference in EU countries. With Latvia, Estonia and Finland directly bordering Russia, it would be a grave miscalculation to allow external bodies (NATO, UN or the US) to continue to be the principal security providers for the EU. While a more traditional military force is required to increase deterrence against Russia, utilising peace-time conscription will allow such a force to be consistent with the ‘civilian power’ objectives of the EU and ensure that civilian values are maintained within such a force.

The second directive, the establishment of a civic counterterrorism initiative, is an equally important task for the EU; one which may be bolstered by peace-time conscription. This directive would not entail mass recruitment, as counterterrorism is similar to policing in its demand for intelligence and very limited police actions to arrest potential terrorists, interrogate suspects, and use information to avoid future attacks. Conscripts enrolled in this programme would essentially assist professional civil authorities in dealing with terrorism and related challenges.

There are several areas where peace-time conscription recruits would assist the EU deal with the scourge of terrorism. These include: intelligence gathering (including internet monitoring), assessing and utilisation, code-breaking, search and rescue in the aftermath of an attack, trauma counselling for those affected by terrorist attacks and criminal investigation to find those responsible for attacks.

Peace-time conscription is appropriate for counterterrorism because it would be a multinational effort, utilising recruits with different backgrounds (national, linguistic, religious) united by their civilian values and citizenship in the EU. Sharing intelligence; making sure that conduits of information remain open is a key to reducing (or completely eradicating) terrorism. Constructing an EU-wide conscription unit, which deals exclusively with counterterrorism, may help reassure EU publics as there would be a trained and visible EU body of citizen-recruits (working alongside professional counterterrorism police units). Terrorism and counterterrorism rely on clandestine operations. There is growing fear that EU freedoms are under-attack by both terrorist groups and

those charged with pursuing them. By bringing conscripts with citizen's values into the 'war on terror' it is reasonable to assume that they can positively contribute to its success. At the very least, multinational conscripts involved in counterterrorism will demonstrate that all communities which comprise the EU share the burden of this challenge equally.

The final directive, to further develop an EU wide civic rapid reaction and disaster relief to deal with a multitude of disaster and post-disaster missions is vital to regional EU security and reducing the loss of life during crises. Rapid reaction – getting to the scene of a disaster in haste – within the EU, is indispensable for life-saving. To that end, peace-time conscripts dealing with this directive should be trained in a variety of tasks including: search and rescue operations in rural and urban areas, techniques of aid distribution, communication of impending disasters (such as violent storms or flooding) to civil populations and preparation for wide-scale evacuations of civilian populations in times of crises. With predictions of environmental disasters (due to global warming), mounting, and unpredictable localised disasters, such as earthquakes and floods, occurring with increasingly frequency, it is important to train peace-time conscripts for dealing with them and associated problems.

If a prime goal of the EU is to protect the lives of EU citizens, it must be prepared for natural and man-made disasters alike. In this, as indicated throughout this work, professional soldiers will not suffice. Conscripted forces, trained and operationally accessible in a timely manner, may be the key to reducing the victims of disasters. The skills acquired by conscripts enrolled in the rapid reaction and disaster relief unit, as in other proposed parts of a peace-time conscription programme, would maintain their expertise even after their conscription period concludes. Therefore, the EU would preserve an extremely useful 'human resource' which may assist their fellow EU citizens for years into the projected future.

Conclusion

Security questions continue to define much of the EU's 21st century identity. This work sought to reshape an old idea, conscription, to act as a progressive element in the budding EU security culture and how it approaches international society at large. It is no longer permissible for the EU to entrust its value system and security to exogenous security providers. As a union of democratic states, the EU must be prepared to defend itself, and the cosmopolitan values it, and international society are increasingly defined by.

This work opened with a definitional section to try and reach an understanding of what conscription is and how it can be rehashed to provide civilian ownership over the political state, making the state more reflective of civilian values, and civilians more responsible for their state's wellbeing. The second part introduced the 'civilian power' approach to international relations, which

is increasingly defining the EU's policy priorities and implementation with the help of peace-time conscription. The third part focussed entirely on theoretically assessing peace-time conscription and how such programmes may help 'humanitise' soldiering by reducing reliance on professional soldiers and infusing military structures with civilian values. This section concluded with a brief discussion of the new 'social contract' which would be necessary before committing civilians to fulfilling foreign policy goals of the EU. The final section of this work presented three peace-time conscription units which may be indispensable for the long-term security of the EU. These were a Specialised Medical Unit; a Local and International Policing Unit and; a Civic and Local Defence Unit. These units, as part of a large peace-time conscription programme, were meant as policy recommendations. They were conceived idealistically as there are many other considerations which need to be assessed before any reasonable steps could be taken to introduce peace-time conscription on the EU level. However, it is hoped that this work will inspire critiques and comments so that the conceptions raised here can lead to debate over how the EU could advance independence over its security without threatening the cosmopolitan values it has been fostering since the end of WWII and now has the window of opportunity to promote throughout international society.